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Abstract: A partial equilibrium model is developed to investigate the interplay of  production 
technology and the difference of market structure between upstream and downstream markets 
on firms’ outsourcing choice. It is found that whether outsourcing or vertical integration 
emerges as the optimal organizational structure depends not only on the cost structure of 
competing upstream firms, but also on the difference between the “thickness” of upstream and 
downstream markets.  In industries where there are more (less) downstream firms than 
upstream suppliers, outsourcing is the optimal organization if and only if the upstream 
suppliers’ technology exhibits economies (diseconomies) of scale. When the upstream firms 
experience constant return to scale, vertical integration is the optimal strategy, irrespective of 
the number of upstream and downstream firms. 
Using firm level data from the German cost structure survey over the period 1992 to 2000, we 
implement the above model by estimating a set of reduced-form equations. We confirm 
empirically that upstream firms' cost structure as well as the difference between the horizontal 
competition at upstream and downstream market have important implications for firms' 
outsourcing decisions.   2
1. Introduction 
Outsourcing or in-house production is a fundamental decision every firm has to face. In the 
last decades, outsourcing activities, especially international outsourcing, seem to be on a 
rising trend (McMillan, 1995; Abraham and Taylor, 1996; Campa and Goldberg, 1997; 
Hummels, Rapoport and Yi, 1998). Firms outsource not only their final-product-related 
services, but also many input-related activities, such as R&D, advertising, and the production 
and services of many other intermediate inputs. The optimal form of organization has been 
extensively studied in a bilateral-monopoly context based on the theory of asset specificity 
and incomplete contracts (Willamson, 1985; Grossman and Hart, 1986). This transaction-cost-
based approach compares the governance costs of productions within a firm with the 
transaction costs of organizing production through the market, and predicts that vertical 
integration decreases with the number of actual or potential trading partners, increases with 
the investment in sunk assets necessary to support a type of transaction, and increases with the 
uncertainty associated with the transaction (Martin, 2002).  
On the other hand, the neoclassical economic analysis focuses on production costs and views 
production cost savings as the motivation for firms’ increasing outsourcing activities. This 
production-cost-based approach compares the production cost difference between internal and 
external production, and predicts that outsourcing occurs because outside suppliers benefit 
from economies of scale, smothers production schedules and centralization of expertise (see 
survey by Heshmati, 2000). 
In the real world firms make their choice between organizing the production within the firm 
or through the market based on the savings not only on production cost but also on transaction 
costs. It is the consideration of economizing both production costs and transaction costs that 
determines firms choice between outsourcing and vertical integration. Despite its apparent 
theoretical importance, empirical relevance and potentially policy implications, there are very   3
few theoretical or empirical papers in economics literature exploring the interplay between 
transaction costs and production costs.
1 An exception is Riordan and Williamson (1985), 
where the choice of organization form is examined in a common framework in which both 
production cost and transaction cost differences are expressed as a function of asset 
specificity. 
As an attempt to build a bridge between the neoclassical and transaction cost modes of 
economic analysis, this paper develops a framework in which both transaction cost and 
production cost considerations are incorporated. Furthermore, the hypotheses derived from 
the model are empirically tested. In order to keep the model empirically testable, we focus on 
one aspect of the impact of transaction cost on outsourcing, namely the difference between the 
“thickness” of upstream and downstream markets.
2 When there are many potential 
downstream buyers, the hold-up problem faced by a upstream supplier owing to asset 
specificity and incomplete contract can be alleviated. This is because the danger of being 
held-up by its downstream partner is mitigated when there are alternative buys, whose 
presence gives the upstream supplier bargaining power and allows it to demand a 
remunerative price (McLaren, 2000). Indeed, transaction cost theory predicts that vertical 
integration should be less, the greater the differences between the number of firms at upstream 
and downstream market (Martin, 2002). The relation between market size and vertical 
disintegration is empirically confirmed by Holmes (1999). 
Specifically, in this paper the interplay between the production technology of upstream 
suppliers and the difference between the number of firms at upstream and downstream market 
on firms’ outsourcing choice is theoretically explored and empirically tested. Outsourcing is 
                                                           
1 In management literature, some case studies (Dritna, 1994); Lacity, Willcocks and Feeny, 1996) suggest that 
firms in general overestimate the production cost advantages of outsourcing and underestimate the role of 
transaction costs.  
2 The “thickness” of the downstream (or upstream) market is defined as the potential number of firms in that 
market.   4
an endogenous choice in our set-up.
3 The attractiveness to outsource for a downstream firm 
depends not only on the number of its potential upstream suppliers, but also on the production 
cost of its suppliers, which in turn depends on how many of its rival firms have chosen to 
outsource or vertically integrate.  
We find that it is not the number of firms at upstream or downstream market per se, but it is 
the difference in the thickness of these two markets, plus the production cost of potential 
suppliers that is pivotal for firms’ outsourcing decisions. For industries where there are more 
downstream firms than potential upstream suppliers, outsourcing emerges as optimal strategy 
if and only if the suppliers experience economies of scale. On the other hand, in industries 
where there are less downstream firms than upstream firms, outsourcing is optimal if and only 
if the upstream suppliers experience diseconomies of scale. 
This is because when the downstream market is “thicker” than the upstream market, each 
upstream supplier produces intermediate inputs for several downstream firms. Hence, the 
upstream suppliers with economies of scale produce at lower marginal costs than their 
counterparts in vertically integrated firms. However, this marginal cost advantage is reversed 
when the upstream suppliers produce with decreasing return to scale technology. On the other 
hand, when there are less downstream firms than upstream firms, several upstream suppliers 
share the input production of one downstream firm. Therefore, it is cheaper for a firm to 
outsource its input production to its upstream supplier(s) than to produce itself, if and only if 
the suppliers experience diseconomies of scale.  
This result is in strong contrast with the findings in existing literature which is based on either 
only transaction cost approach or only production cost approach. Transaction cost theory 
                                                           
3 Both Chen (2002) and Grossman and Helpman (2002) also endogenize organizational structure of firms. Chen 
(2002) investigates the role of strategic purchase and learning by doing in vertical disintegration. Grossman and 
Helpman (2002) analyse the trade-off between the cost of governance in an integrated firm v.s. the cost of searching 
partners and imperfect contracting for an outsourcing firm.   5
predicts that vertical integration decreases with the difference between the number of firms at 
upstream and downstream market. On the other hand, production cost theory says that 
outsourcing occurs because upstream suppliers benefit from economies of scale. Both 
predictions no longer hold true when the interdependence of transaction costs and production 
costs is taken into account. 
Using firm level data from the German cost structure survey, we test our theoretical 
predictions from a panel of 14 industries consisting of 3120 firms (with 1690 upstream and 
1430 downstream firms) from the German cost structure census over the period 1992-2001. It 
is found that except for one industry group, namely the manufacture of pharmaceuticals, 
medicinal chemicals and botanical products, our theoretical predictions are confirmed. 
In the literature there is no well-defined method to measure outsourcing. For an outsourcing 
firm, its material costs increase but its total costs should decrease. In the empirical part of this 
paper, we interpret the evidence of outsourcing from the following three changes: a. an 
increase in intermediate material consumptions as a share of gross production;  b. a decrease 
in labour input as a share of gross production; c. a decrease in cost of capital as a share of 
gross of production. Moreover, the mark-ups and economies of scale are simultaneously 
estimated for both downstream and upstream firms by adopting the approach of Klette (1999) 
with some modifications. 
Although there are a number of empirical studies examining the impact of outsourcing on 
labour market and firm performance,
4 there are few empirical papers investigating the causes 
of outsourcing. To our knowledge this is the first empirical paper which analyses the 
determinants of outsourcing from both transaction cost and production cost considerations. 
Since the industry characteristics such as market structure and cost structure are the main 
                                                           
4 For example, Feenstra and Hanson (1996) examine the impact of international outsourcing on the relative 
demand for skilled labour of US manufacturing industries for the period of 1972-1992.  Goezig and Stephan   6
focus in our analysis, this study can hopefully contribute to explain the cross-sectional and 
cross-regional differences in outsourcing activities, which have been documented by some 
scholars (for example, Chinitz ,1961; Helper, 1991).  
The paper is organized in four sections. Literature review and motivation are given in Section 
1. In Section 2 we set up a basic model and solve for three different scenarios. In Section 3, 
the model is estimated and empirical results are presented. Conclusions are given in Section 4. 
 
2. Model 
In this section, we develop a model that explores the role of industry characteristics such as 
market structure and production technology in firms’ outsourcing decisions. The focus is to 
investigate how horizontal competition in both upstream and downstream markets, as well as 
the production technology of the upstream suppliers affect firms’ decision to outsource vs. 
vertically integrate. 
There are N potential downstream purchasers and M potential upstream suppliers, 
respectively. For upstream supplier m (or upstream division m for an integrated firm), 
m=1,2,…,M, its production cost is given by  ) ( m x I , where  m x  and  ) ( m x I  are the output and 
the total cost of supplier m. The price charged by upstream supplier m to its downstream 
purchaser(s) is  m r .  Hence, the profit of upstream supplier m is given by  ) ( m m m m x I x r u − = .  
On the other hand, for downstream firm n (or downstream division n for an integrated firm), 
n=1,2,…,N, the  price it pays to its upstream supplier(s) for the intermediate good is  n β . The 
cost of transforming intermediate inputs into the final goods is  ) ( n q c . Hence, the total cost of 
producing the final good is  ) ( n n n q c q + β . The market demand for the final goods is  ) (Q p , 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
(2002) shows that firms tend to overestimate the benefits accruing from outsourcing of services which were 
previously provided internally.    7
where 0 ) ( < ′ Q p , and  0 ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( < ′ ′ − ′ + + ′ ′ ≡ ∆ c Q p N Q Q p .
5  Therefore, the profit function of 
downstream firm n is given by  ( ) ) ( n n n n n q c q pq + − = β π .   
The timing of game is structured as follows:  
Game:  
Stage 1: Downstream firms decide to outsource or vertically integrate. 
Stage 2: Upstream firms compete in intermediate input production by choosing input prices. 
Stage 3: Downstream firms choose their output quantities and compete in final product market 
via. Cournot. 
 
Since there is neither incomplete nor imperfect information involved in the game, the 
equilibrium concept we adopt is subgame perfect equilibrium. Before proceeding we would 
like to make the following assumptions. 
Assumption 1: The ratio between the intermediate input and final output  is 1. 
Assumption 2: Each vertically integrated firm has only one upstream and downstream 
division. The upstream division of an integrated firm only produces the intermediate input for 
its downstream division.  
 
Assumption 3: The demand and cost functions,  ) (⋅ p,   ) (⋅ c and  ) (⋅ I  behave so that a 
downstream firm’s output decreases with its own marginal cost and increases with its 
competitors’ marginal costs. 
We proceed with our analysis by classifying three scenarios according to the difference 
between the number of upstream suppliers and downstream firms. 
2.1. There are more downstream firms than upstream suppliers, i.e.,  M N > . 
The optimal make-or-buy decision of downstream firms is solved at the subgame perfect 
equilibrium. In order to do that, for any J, J= 0, 1, …, M-1, the first J downstream firms are 
                                                           
5 This is the second order condition of downstream firms.   8
taken to be vertically integrated. W.L.O.G., they are assumed to be vertically integrated with 
the first J upstream supplier, respectively. The question is what kind of organization structure 
the last (N-J) downstream firms are going to choose?   
Case 1:  1 − = M J . 
That is, the first  ) 1 ( − M firms are vertically integrated. In this case, the upstream firm M is a 
monopolist in upstream market. The last (N-M+1) downstream firms compare the profits 
under outsourcing (scenario (A)) with those under vertical integration (scenario (B)), and then 
make their make-or-buy decisions.   
(A) If the last (N-M+1) firms choose to outsource, they buy their intermediate inputs from the 
monopolistic upstream supplier M for the price 
*
n β  and produce the final good 
*
n q ,  where 
*
n β  
and 
*
n q  satisfies the following conditions,
6 
a.   ) ) 1 ((
* *
n n q M N I + − ′ > β ,  and  
   ( ) 0 ) ( ) ( ) (







* * ,  for  N M M n ,..., 1 , + = . 
b. On the other hand, for the first M-1 integrated firms,  
) (
* *
n n q I′ = β , and  ( ) 0 ) ( ) ( ) (
* * * * * = ′ + − + ′ n n n q c Q p q Q p β , for  1 ,..., 2 , 1 − = M n . 
 (B) If one of the last (N-M+1) firms vertically integrates with the upstream supplier M, 
w.l.o.g., that is downstream firm M, then the equilibrium price of the intermediate inputs (
*
n β ) 
and the equilibrium output of final good (
*
n q ) satisfy: 
) (
* *
n n q I′ = β , and  ( ) 0 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
* * * * * = ′ + ′ − + ′ n n n q c q I Q p q Q p , where 
* *
n Nq Q =  .
 7   (1) 
                                                           
6 Due to symmetry of the last (N-M+1) firms, if one of them chooses to outsource, the rest firms also choose to 
outsource.    9
The last (N-M+1) downstream firms compare their profits under (A) with under (B), and 
choose between whether to buy the intermediate input from the upstream suppliers or to 
vertically integrate.  
Case 2:  2 − ≤ M J . 
Different from Case 1, in this case there are at least two upstream suppliers competing in 
producing homogenous intermediate inputs. The price of intermediate inputs is thereby 
reduced to suppliers’ marginal cost of in industries where the upstream firms experience 
constant or increasing return to scale technology. But for industries where upstream suppliers 
have decreasing return to scale technology, the price is still higher than their marginal costs 
(Tirole 1993, P215). Given that the first J downstream firms are vertically integrated, we 
solve for the optimal strategy of the last (N-J) downstream firms. Again, we consider two 
scenarios: 
(A) If the last (N-J) downstream firms decide to outsource, the equilibrium price of   
intermediate inputs (
*
n β ), and the output of final goods (
*
n q ) satisfies the following equations: 

























+ β  if  0 ) ( > ⋅ ′ I .  And 
( ) 0 ) ( ) ( ) (







* * . 
For the first J integrated firms,  J n ,..., 2 , 1 = ,  
) (
* *
n n q I′ = β , and  ( ) 0 ) ( ) ( ) (
* * * * * = ′ + − + ′ n n n q c Q p q Q p β . 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
7 The downstream firm M+1,…, firm N are assumed  to be able to produce the intermediate good at the cost of an 
integrated firm.    10
(B) On the other hand, if the last (N-J) downstream firms choose to vertically integrate, the 
equilibrium prices of the intermediate goods is  ) (
* *
n n q I′ = β . The equilibrium output of the 
final goods is 
*
n q , which is the root to equation (1). 
The last (N-J) downstream firms compare their profits under (A) with those under (B), and 
decide whether to outsource or vertical integrate.  
From Case 1 and Case 2, the equilibrium strategy is described in Proposition 1. 
Proposition 1: In industries where there are more potential downstream firms than upstream 
suppliers, outsourcing is the optimal organization structure if the production technology of 
upstream suppliers exhibits constant or decreasing return to scale
8. When the upstream 
suppliers experience either constant or decreasing return to scale, the  vertical integration is 
the optimal organization structure. 
Proof: See Appendix 
 
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is as follows. In industries where there are more potential 
downstream firms than upstream suppliers, each upstream supplier produces the intermediate 
input for several downstream purchasers. With economies of scale production technology, the 
upstream suppliers can produce the intermediate input at lower marginal cost than the 
upstream divisions in a vertically integrated firm. Accordingly, the cost of intermediate input 
is lower for an outsourcing downstream firm than for an integrated firm.  This leads the 
downstream firms to chose outsource over vertically integration. In industries where upstream 
firms experience diseconomies of scale, the marginal cost of upstream suppliers is higher than 
that the upstream divisions in integrated firms. Accordingly, the cost of buying intermediate 
goods exceeds the cost of in-house production.  As a consequence, the vertical integration is 
the optimal organization structure.  
                                                           




) ) 1 (( ) (
* *
p n q p
c p
n q
q M N I q I n n
′ + ′ ′ − ∆
∆ ′ ′ − ′
>
+ − ′ − ′ .   11
 
2.2 There are less downstream firms than upstream suppliers, i.e.,  M N < . 
As in Section 2.1, we want to investigate the optimal strategy of the last (N-J) downstream 
firms, firm J+1, …, firm N, given that the first J downstream firms are vertically integrated 
with the first J upstream firms, respectively, for any J (J = 0, 1, …, N-1).  As in the last 
subsection, two scenarios are considered. 
(A) If the last (N-J) downstream firms choose to outsource, then the equilibrium price of the 
intermediate goods charged by the upstream suppliers is down to their marginal costs for 
industries where the potential upstream suppliers experience increasing or constant return to 
scale. This is because there are at least two upstream suppliers competing in selling the 
homogenous intermediate inputs to the downstream firms. But for upstream industries which 
exhibit diseconomies of scale, the upstream suppliers charge input price higher than their 
marginal costs (Again, Tirole 1993). Denote 
*
n β  and 
*
n q  as the equilibrium price of the 
intermediate goods and the equilibrium quantity of the final goods, respectively, they can be 
described as follows: 
For  J n ,..., 2 , 1 = , ) (
* *
n n q I′ = β , and  ( ) 0 ) ( ) ( ) (
* * * * * = ′ + − + ′ n n n q c Q p q Q p β . 

























+ β  if  0 ) ( > ⋅ ′ I .  And 
( ) 0 ) ( ) ( ) (







* * . 
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(B) On the other hand, if the last (N-J) downstream firms decide to vertically integrate,
9 the 
equilibrium price of intermediate goods is  ) (
*
n q I′ . And the equilibrium output of downstream 
firms is  
*
n q  , which is determined by equation (1).             
The last (N-J) downstream firms compare their profits under scenario (A) and (B), and their 
equilibrium strategies are describe by the following Proposition. 
Proposition 2: In industries where there are less downstream firms than potential upstream 
suppliers, and the potential upstream suppliers have diseconomies of scale, outsourcing is the 
optimal organization structure.
10  In contrary, when the upstream suppliers have increasing 
or constant return to scale technology, vertical integration is the equilibrium strategy for the 
downstream firms. 
Proof: See Appendix 
In industries where there are less downstream firms than potential upstream suppliers,  the 
downstream firms choose outsourcing over vertical integration, only when the upstream firms 
have  decreasing return to scale technology. This result is in strong contrast with that of 
Proposition 1. This seemly contra-intuitive result is due to the fact that several upstream 
suppliers share production of the intermediate inputs for one downstream firm in the case 
there are less downstream firms than potential upstream suppliers. Hence, when the upstream 
firms experience diseconomies of scale, it is cheaper for a downstream firm to buy the 
intermediate inputs from the upstream firms than to produce it by its integrated upstream 
division, and consequently outsourcing is the optimal organization structure for the 
downstream firms. Naturally when the upstream suppliers have increasing or constant return 
to scale technology, it is cheaper for the downstream firms to produce the intermediate inputs 
by their upstream divisions, and vertical integration is the optimal strategy. 
                                                           
9 In this case, the last (M-N) upstream suppliers are inactive. 
10 The condition is that the upstream firms’ cost function is sufficiently convex, i.e., 
) * (
) ( ) ( ) (
*
* *









′ + ′ ′ − ∆
∆ ′ ′ − ′
>
−
− ′ − ′
.   13
2.3 there are the same number of downstream and upstream firms, i.e.,  M N = . 
In this subsection, the optimal strategy of downstream firms is analysed in industries where 
the number of downstream firms happens to be the same as the number of potential upstream 
suppliers. As in the last two subsections, we want to examine the optimal strategy of the last 
(N-J) downstream firms, (firm J+1, …, firm N), given that the first J downstream firms are 
vertically integrated with the first J upstream firms (J = 0, 1, …, N-1), respectively, for any J 
(J = 0, 1, …, N-1).  As in Subsection 2.1, we consider the following two cases. 
Case 1:  1 − = N J  
That is, except for the last downstream firm, firm N, all the other downstream firms are 
vertically integrated. To avoid double-marginalization problem, it is optimal for the 
downstream firm N to integrate with the upstream firm N, no matter what kind of production 
technology the upstream suppliers have. 
Case 2:  2 − ≤ N J . That is,  2 ,..., 1 , 0 − = N J.  
The last (N-J) downstream firms compare their profits under outsourcing with those under 
vertical integration and then make their choices. We consider the following two scenarios.  
 (A) if the last (N-J) downstream firms outsource, since each downstream firm outsources its 
intermediate input to one and only one upstream supplier, and there are at least two upstream 
suppliers competing in the production of the homogenous intermediate inputs, the equilibrium 
price of intermediate inputs is simply the marginal cost of the upstream suppliers if they 
experience increasing or constant return to scale technology. That is  ) ( ) (
* * *
n n n q I x I ′ = ′ = β . On 
the other hand, for the upstream firms which have diseconomies of scale, the price they   14
charge to their downstream purchasers is greater than their marginal costs i.e.,   ) (
* *
n n q I′ > β . 
The equilibrium output of downstream firm, 
*
n q , is the solution to the following equations. 
( ) 0 ) ( ) ( ) (
* * * * * = ′ + − + ′ n n n q c Q p q Q p β , where 
* *
n Nq Q =  ,  N n ,..., 2 , 1 = . 
(B) On the other hand, if the last (N-J) downstream firms decide to vertically integrate, the 
equilibrium price of the intermediate goods and equilibrium quantity of the final product are 
given by 
*
n β  and 
*
n q , respectively, where  ) (
* *
n n q I′ = β , and 
*
n q  is the solution to equation (1). 
Hence, the last (N-J) downstream firms pay the same price for the intermediate goods, 
produce the same amount of final product and earn the same profits under outsourcing as 
under vertical integration, as long as the upstream suppliers experience increasing or constant 
return to scale. According, the downstream firms are indifferent between outsourcing and 
vertical integration. However, when the upstream suppliers have diseconomies of scale 
technology, the downstream firms strictly prefer to vertically integrate. Summarizing Case 1 
and Case 2, we obtain the following proposition. 
Proposition 3: If the number of upstream and downstream firms happens to be the same, 
vertical integration is the optimal strategy of downstream firms, irrespective of the cost 
structure of upstream suppliers. 
Proof: See Appendix 
The logic behind this result is similar to those behind the previous two propositions. Since 
there are the same number of downstream and upstream firms, if outsourcing occurred, each 
upstream supplier would produce the intermediate input for one and only one downstream 
firm. Therefore, neither economies of scale nor diseconomies of scale production technology 
would bring marginal cost advantage to the potential upstream suppliers, and accordingly the 
input cost advantage to the outsourcing downstream firms. On top of it, vertically integrated 
structure benefits from the avoidance of  double-marginalization problem. As a result, vertical   15
integration is the optimal structure for industries where the downstream and upstream market 
structure are very similar. 
2.4 the impact of cost structure and market structure on outsourcing 
The above three Propositions can be summarized in the following theorem: 
Theorem: Firms’ outsourcing decision depends not only on the cost structure of the potential 
upstream suppliers, but also on the difference between the number of upstream and 
downstream firms.  
a.  With upstream suppliers’ technology exhibiting economies (diseconomies) of scale, 
downstream firms choose to outsource, when the number of downstream firms is 
greater (less) than that of potential upstream suppliers.  
b.  With upstream suppliers’ technology exhibiting constant return to scale, downstream 
firms choose to vertically integrate, regardless the number of  upstream and 
downstream firms. 
c.  When there are the same number of upstream and downstream firms, vertical 
integration is the optimal organization structure, irrespective of the production 
technology of both upstream and downstream firms.  
 
The asymptotic decision of downstream firms can be trivially obtained from the above 
theorem. As the number of downstream firms gets very large, there will eventually be more 
downstream firms than upstream firms, which leads to the following corollary. 
Corollary: As the competition in downstream market gets very large, outsourcing (vertical 
integration) is firms’ optimal strategy if upstream suppliers have increasing (decreasing or 
constant) return to scale technology. 
 
The theorem tells us it is neither production technology per se, nor the horizontal competition 
at either downstream or upstream market per se, but rather the difference between the 
“thickness” of these two markets, plus the production technology that determines firms’ 
outsourcing activities. For any given number of upstream firms and a given production 
technology, say, economies of scale, firms’ incentive to outsource is affected discontinuously   16
by the horizontal competition at downstream market. As long as there are less downstream 
firms than upstream suppliers, firms choose to vertically integrate. However, as soon as the 
number of downstream firms exceeds the number of upstream firms, firms switches to 
outsourcing. Therefore, for any given thickness of the upstream market, firms’ outsourcing 
activity is a upward step function of the competition at downstream market when the 
upstream suppliers experience economies of scale, but a downward step function when they 
experience diseconomies of scale.  If the upstream firms produce with constant return to scale 
technology, downstream firms always choose to vertically integrate, independent of the 
downstream market structure. 
A well-known result in the literature is that a downstream monopolist prefers to vertically 
integrate owing to double-marginalization problem. From the above analysis, we know that 
this is only true when both upstream and downstream firms are monopolists in their respective 
markets. As soon as there is an entrant either at  the upstream or the downstream market, 
outsourcing may become the optimal strategy. 
 
3. Empirical Implementation 
3.1 Estimation 
We test the theoretical predictions derived from the model in the previous section by using a 
panel of firms of 14 industries from the German cost structure census over the period 1992-
2000. Table 1 shows the name of industries and the number of firms in each industry. These 
industries belong to one of four major industry groups at the 2- or 3-digit level. Each major   17
group consists of upstream and downstream industries at the 4-digit level
11 . We have in total 
9 downstream and 5 upstream industries, and 3120 firms.  
In the first step of the analysis we provide evidence that industries’ outsourcing of 
intermediate production has been a predominant phenomenon over the period 1992-2000. 
Firms outsource in order to save resources either in terms of labour or capital. Although 
material costs increase when firms outsource, total costs should decrease. Thus, we interpret 
the following evidence as indication of outsourcing. (a) an increase in intermediate material 
consumptions (measured as a share of gross production). (b) a decrease in labour input as a 
share of gross production. (c) a decrease in cost of capital as a share of gross production.  
Table 2 shows the results of regressions of dependent share variables according to (a), (b) and 
(c) on a linear time trend. We find that outsourcing is a significant phenomenon for 
downstream industries 34.10, 24.42 and 21.21-21.23, whereas outsourcing is not evident for 
industries 32.20, 32.30, 21.24 and 21.25. 
The model outlined in the previous sections  predicts that firms’ choice of outsourcing 
depends on the economies of scale of upstream firms as well as on the difference between 
market thickness of downstream and upstream industries. Note that in order to capture the 
possible product differenciation in these industries, we use the mark-up (i.e., the degree of 
market competition) rather than the number of firms in our empirical analysis as the indicator 
of market thickness.   
To simultaneously estimate the economies of scale and the mark-ups from firm-level data, we 
adopt the approach of Klette (1999) with some minor modifications. 
                                                           
11 An exception is 3-digit level industry 21.1  We have merged industries 2111 and 2112 due to the small number of 
firms in industry 2111.   18
We assume a production function  ) ( it t i it X F A Q = , where  it Q  and  it X  represent output and a 
vector of inputs for firm i in year t, respectively. And  i A  denotes firm-specific productivity, 
while ) (⋅ t F  is common to all firms. 




it it x q α , where 
small letters denote logarithm of variables, i.e.,  1 , log log − − = ∆ t i it it X X x , and 
j
it α  is the output 
elasticity of input j. As an example,  ) log( ) log( 1 , − − = ∆ t i it it Q Q q . Note that we assume  0 = ∆ i a , 
i.e. Ai is firm-specific and time-invariant. 
The output elasticity 
j
it α  and input




it s a µ = , where 
j
it s  is the cost 








s = , and  it µ  is the ratio between 
price and marginal costs (Klette, 1999). 
Similar to Klette (1999) we make a distinction between variable inputs x
j and fixed inputs x
K. 
The industry-specific long and short run Returns to Scale (RS) are denoted as  l η and 
s










l l α η α α η + = + =∑
∈
, for industry  L l , , 1 … = . 
We implement the following approach to estimate RS  









l lt l it x x q ε α η λ λ + ∆ + ∆ + + = ∆ ∑
∈
0 ,      (2) 
where  l 0 λ  and  lt λ  are industry-specific intercepts and time-effects,  T t , , 1 … = , and  it ε  is 
assumed to be iid  ) , 0 ( ε σ N .  
Accordingly, we estimate industry-specific mark-ups  l µ  from   19









it l lt l it x x s q ε α µ λ λ + ∆ + ∆ + + = ∆ ∑
∈
0 ,     (3) 






it s s s − + = . Note the similarity of (3) to the Törnquist index. 
Results of the estimations are shown in Table 3. Note that Hausman tests on the differences 
between OLS and 2SLS, where current values of output differences have been instrumented 
with lagged values of output differences, turned out to be not significant, thus indicating that 
OLS yields both consistent and efficient estimates. Table 3 shows the average values of profit 
shares and summarizes the main results of the estimations.  
 
3.2 Interpretation 
Let’s look at industry by industry. For automobile and freight vehicle industry (34), Table 3 
tells us that the upstream parts suppliers have increasing return technology. In addition, since 
the markup of downstream automobile and trailer producers (1.000) is significantly less than 
those of upstream suppliers (1.041 and 1.058, respectively), the downstream market is thicker 
than the upstream market. The theory predicts that outsourcing is the equilibrium in this 
industry, which is indeed  the case from Table 2.  
The industry of the radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus (32) also 
confirms our theoretical predictions. Both upstream and downstream firms experiencing 
constant return to scale, and the competition among the downstream paper producers is less 
than their upstream input suppliers (average markup 1.009 and 1.031 for the downstream 
firms, respectively, but 1.083 for the upstream firms). The theory says that the firms of both 
downstream markets choose vertical integration, which is confirmed by Table 2.   20
With respective to the paper industry (21), the upstream suppliers have increasing return to 
scale, but downstream producers have different production technologies. For downstream 
industry 21.21, 21.22, and 21.23, the downstream market is thicker than the upstream market, 
the theory predicts that outsourcing is the equilibrium in these industries, which is consistent 
with Table 2. In contrast, for industry 21.24, the downstream market is less competitive than 
the upstream market (markup 1.119 for the downstream but 1.076 for the upstream market). 
Hence, vertical integration is the equilibrium in this industry, which is also consistent with 
Table 2 . For industry 21.25, the theory predicts outsourcing, which is contradicting the 
empirical evidence. 
The troubling candidate is the industry (24.4) of Pharmaceutical, medicinal chemicals and 
botanical products. From Table 3 the production technology of upstream firms is constant 
return to scale, and the competition among the downstream producers is lower than among the 
upstream suppliers (with markup 0.931 and 1.093, respectively). According the theory, 
vertical integration is the optimal structure of this industry. But from Table 2, there is 
evidence of outsourcing. The inconsistency between the theoretical prediction and the 
empirical evidence is attributable to the undervalued R&D costs due to lack of R&D data. The 
industry of Pharmaceutical and medicinal chemicals is a high-tech industry. Firms are 
expected to have high R&D expenditures. Unfortunately, we don’t have data on firms’ R&D 
costs, except for R&D-related labor costs. If the R&D costs as a part of fixed costs were 
included, we would expect economies of scale for both upstream firms. Outsourcing would 
then be the equilibrium in this industry. 
4. Conclusion  
As an attempt to combine transaction-cost with production-cost approach to explain recently 
rising outsourcing activities, a framework is developed in which both the difference of market   21
structure between upstream and downstream markets and the production technology of 
upstream firms are incorporated. It is found that it is not the difference in market thickness per 
se, but it is the interdependence of this difference with the cost structure of upstream firms 
that is crucial for firms’ outsourcing choice. Outsourcing emerges as the equilibrium 
organization structure when there are more downstream firms than upstream firms and the 
production technology of upstream suppliers exhibits economies of scale. Outsourcing also 
prevails in industries where there are less firms at downstream market than at upstream 
market, but production technology of upstream firms exhibits diseconomies of scale.  In any 
other industries, vertical integration is the optimal organization structure. 
The theoretical predictions are tested by using a panel of 3120 firms belonging to 14 
industries from 4 two-digit industry groups from the German cost structure census over the 
period 1992-2000. It is found that apart from one industry group, the theoretical hypothesis is 
consistent with the empirical findings.  
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Appendix: 
Proof of Proposition 1: for any J, J= 0, 1, …, M-1, the first J downstream firms are assumed 
to be vertically integrated with the first J upstream supplier, respectively. We want to solve 
for the optimal strategy of the last (N-J) downstream firms. Let’s consider two cases. 
Case 1:  1 − = M J . 
That is, the first  ) 1 ( − M firms are vertically integrated. In this case, the upstream firm M is a 
monopolist in upstream market. Therefore, the price of intermediate goods paid by the last 
(N-M+1) downstream firms is higher than the marginal cost of the upstream supplier M. The 
last (N-M+1) downstream firms compare their profits when they outsource with those when 
they vertically integrate, and make make-or-buy decisions.   
(A) If the last (N-M+1) firms choose to outsource, from the first order conditions of Stage 2 
and Stage 3,  we can derive 
OS
n β  and 
OS
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 (B) If one of the last (N-M+1) firms vertically integrates with their upstream supplier M, 
w.l.o.g., assuming it is firm M, then 
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n β  and 
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  (2) 
Since  () ) ( ) 1 ( n n q I q M N I ′ ≥ + − ′  for 0 ) ( ≥ ⋅ ′ I , from equation (1) and (2) and Assumption 4 , 








n π π < ,  for  0 ) ( ≥ ⋅ ′ I  and for  N M M n ,..., 1 , + = . 
Hence, the last (N-M+1) firms choose to vertically integrate for constant or decreasing return 
to scale. 
On the other hand, for increasing return to scale  ) (⋅ I , 0 ) ( < ⋅ ′ I , from the first order conditions 
of Stage 3 under (A), we can derive the relationship between two endogenous variables of 
















′ ′ − ′ ∆
′ + ′ ′ − ∆
=
β
 ,  where  c p N Q p ′ ′ − ′ + + ′ ′ ≡ ∆ ) 1 (.  
At Stage 2, ∵  m m q x =  for  1 ,.., 1 − = M m , and  N M M q q x + + = ... , 
                                                           
12 The rest downstream firms are assumed to be able to produce at the cost of an integrated firm.   23
∴  The first order condition of Stage 2,  () 0 ) ( = ′ − +
m
m
m m m dr
dx
x I r x , can be rewritten as 
[] 0 ) ) 1 (( = + − ′ − +
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n q q >   if  ) (∗  holds true; i.e., downstream 
firms choose to outsource for  0 ) ( < ⋅ ′ I . 
Case 2:  2 − ≤ M J . 
In this case there are at least two upstream suppliers competing in producing homogenous 
intermediate goods. The price of intermediate goods is thereby reduced to the marginal cost of 
the suppliers in industries where the upstream firms experience constant or increasing return 
to scale technology. But for industries where upstream suppliers have decreasing return to 
scale technology, the price is still higher than their marginal costs (Tirole 1993).  
(A) If the last (N-J) downstream firms decide to outsource, from the first order conditions of 
Stage 2 and Stage 3, we have 
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(B) On the other hand, if the last (N-J) downstream firms choose to vertically integrate, the 




n q I′ = β . The equilibrium output of the 
final goods is 
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n q ,   
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n q q =  if  0 ) ( = ⋅ ′ I . 
Summarizing the results from Case 1 and Case 2, we obtain Proposition 1.# 
 
Proof of Proposition 2: W.L.O.G., for any J, J= 0, 1, …, N-1, the first J downstream firms are 
assumed to be vertically integrated with the first J upstream supplier, respectively. We want to 
solve for the optimal strategy of the last (N-J) downstream firms.  
(A) If the last (N-J) downstream firms decide to outsource, since there are at least two 
upstream suppliers competing in producing homogenous intermediate goods, the price of 
intermediate goods is reduced to the marginal cost of the suppliers if  0 ) ( ≤ ⋅ ′ I , but higher than 
the marginal costs if  0 ) ( > ⋅ ′ I . From the first order conditions of Stage 2 and Stage 3, we have 
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.   (5) 
(B) On the other hand, if the last (N-J) downstream firms choose to vertically integrate, the 




n q I′ = β .
13 The equilibrium output of the 
final goods is 
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n q ,   
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− ′  for  0 ) ( = ⋅ ′ I . 
                                                           
13 The last (M-N) upstream firms are inactive.   25








n q q =  if  0 ) ( = ⋅ ′ I . 
That is, if upstream firms have increasing or constant return to scale technology, it is optimal 
for downstream firms to vertically integrate.
14 
On the other hand, for decreasing return to scale  ) (⋅ I , i.e.  0 ) ( > ⋅ ′ I , from the first order 
conditions of Stage 3 under (A), we can derive the relationship between two endogenous 
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β , for  N J n ,..., 1 + = and for the last symmetric (N-J) firms. 
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n q q >   if  ) (∗∗  holds true; i.e., downstream 
firms choose to outsource when  0 ) ( > ⋅ ′ I . 
Summarizing the above results, we obtain Proposition 2.# 
 
Proof of Proposition 3: for any J, J= 0, 1, …, M-1, the first J downstream firms are assumed 
to be vertically integrated with the first J upstream firms, respectively. Let’s consider two 
cases. 
Case 1:  1 − = N J . 
That is, except for the last downstream firm N and the last upstream firm M, the other firms 
are vertically integrated. To avoid double-marginalization, it is optimal for the last 
downstream firm N to vertically integrate with the last upstream M. 
                                                           
14 When firms are indifferent between outsourcing and vertical integration, it is assumed that they outsource.   26
Case 2:  2 − ≤ N J . 
(A) If the last (N-J) downstream firms decide to outsource, since there are at least two 
upstream suppliers competing in producing homogenous intermediate goods, the price of 
intermediate goods is thereby reduced to the marginal cost of the suppliers for  0 ) ( ≤ ⋅ ′ I , but 
higher than their marginal costs if  0 ) ( > ⋅ ′ I . From the first order conditions of Stage 2 and 
Stage 3, we have 
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(B) On the other hand, if the last (N-J) downstream firms choose to vertically integrate, the 




n q I′ = β . The equilibrium output of the 
final goods is 
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n q ,   
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n q q <  if  0 ) ( > ⋅ ′ I . 
Summarizing the results from Case 1 and Case 2, we obtain Proposition 3.# 
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Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products (21)      
Manufacture of pulp, paper and paperboard  U  21.1  197
  
Manufacture of articles of paper and paperboard (21.2)      
Manufacture of corrugated paper and paperboard and of 
containers of paper and paperboard 
D 21.21  379
Manufacture of household and sanitary goods and of toilet 
requisites 
D 21.22  70
Manufacture of paper stationery  D  21.23  136
Manufacture of wallpaper  D  21.24  18
Manufacture of other articles of paper and paperboard n.e.c.  D  21.25  149
  
Manufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemicals and botanical products 
(24.4) 
Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products  U  24.41  20
Manufacture of pharmaceutical preparations  D  24.42  299
  
Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus 
(32) 
Manufacture of electronic valves and tubes and other 
electronic components 
U 32.1  217
Manufacture of television and radio transmitters and 
apparatus for line telephony and line teleg 
D 32.2  121
Manufacture of television and radio receivers, sound or video 
recording or reproducing apparatus 
D 32.3  181
  
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 
(34) 
  
Manufacture of motor vehicles  D  34.1  73
Manufacture of bodies (coachwork) for motor vehicles; 
manufacture of trailers and semi-trailers 
U 34.2  686
Manufacture of parts and accessories for motor vehicles and 
their engines 
U 34.3  570
 total  3120
U=Upstream, D=Downstream Industry     
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34.10 +  -  -  yes 
24.42 +  -  (−)  yes 
32.20  (−) (−) (−)  no 
32.30  (−)  - -  no 
21.21 +  -  -  yes 
21.22 +  -  (−)  yes 
21.23 +  -  -  yes 
21.24  - (-) - no 
21.25 +  (−) (−)  no 
+ statistically significant at a 5 percent level   
- statistically significant at a 5 percent level   
(−) statistically not significant at a 5 percent level   
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Table 3: Average Profit Shares, estimated Markups and Returns to Scale 
 
  Mean of Profit 
share (gross)
a 
Mean of Profit 
share (net)
b  Markup









           
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers (34)     
Upstream          
34.20 0.063 0.018  1.041  0.972  1.013  IRS* 
    (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
34.30 0.097 0.024  1.058  0.959  1.014  IRS* 
    (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.007) 
Downstream          
34.10 0.062 0.015  1.000  0.960  0.995  CRS
g 
    (0.016)  (0.013)  (0.008) 
         
Manufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemicals and botanical products (24.4) 
Upstream          
24.41 0.205 0.138  1.093  0.913  0.918  CRS
g 
    (0.060)  (0.050)  (0.094) 
Downstream            
24.42 0.144 0.077  0.931  0.897  0.921  DRS* 
    (0.017)  (0.010)  (0.016) 
         
Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus (32) 
Upstream          
32.10 0.111 0.013  1.083  0.957  1.015  CRS
g 
    (0.016)  (0.013)  (0.015) 
Downstream          
32.20 0.076 0.015  1.031  0.952  0.973  CRS
g 
    (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.018) 
32.30 0.075 0.018  1.009  0.942  1.012  CRS
g 
    (0.021)  (0.018)  (0.019) 
         
Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products (21)     
Upstream             
21.11, 21.12  0.095  0.028  1.076  0.992  1.032  IRS* 
    (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.007) 
Downstream          
21.21 0.110 0.027  1.072  0.956  1.021  IRS* 
    (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.009) 
21.22 0.107 0.033  0.886  0.900  0.918  DRS* 
    (0.017)  (0.014)  (0.019) 
21.23 0.104 0.032  1.040  0.921  1.006  CRS
g 
    (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.013) 
21.24 0.088 0.016  1.119  1.024  0.982  CRS
g 
    (0.026)  (0.022)  (0.033) 
21.25 0.123 0.046  0.991  0.916  0.996  CRS
g 
     (0.022)  (0.016)  (0.015) 
RS=Return to Scale, I=increasing, D=decreasung, * statistically significant at a 5 percent level. 
a of variable inputs, 
b of all inputs (variable and fixed), 
c ratio P/MC, 
d RS due to variable inputs 
e RS due to all 
inputs (variable and fixed), 
f Test of the null of CRS. 
g The null of CRS is not rejected at a 5 percent level. 
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Data Description 
We utilize firm-level data of the German Cost Structure Census of manufacturing compiled 
by the Federal Statistical Office over the period 1992-2000. Only firms with 20 or more 
employees are covered. This data base comprises almost all large German manufacturing 
firms with 500 and more employees over the entire period. Firms with less than 500 
employees are included as a random sample that can be assumed to be representative for the 
small firm segment as a whole. Usually the smaller firms report for four subsequent years and 
are then substituted by other small firms (rotating panel).
15 
We use gross production as measure of output. The available information in the cost structure 
survey on inputs comprises the number of employees, labor compensation, depreciation of 
capital, material inputs, rents and leases, energy consumption, commodity inputs, sales of 
commodities, expenses for external repair and contract work (farming out of production) as 
well as some other production related costs. Input and output series are deflated using 
industry-specific gross production and input price indices provided by the Federal Statistical 
Office. 
In order to minimize number of reported zero input quantities,
16 we aggregated the inputs into 
the following categories: (1) material inputs: intermediate material consumption plus 
commodity inputs; (2) labor compensation: saleries and wages plus employer's social 
insurance contributions; (3) energy consumption; (4) capital inputs (internal and external): 
capital depreciation (internal) plus rents and leases (external), (5) other inputs: other 
expenses/costs related to production e.g. transportation services, consulting or marketing;  
(6) external services: e.g. repair costs and external contract work (farming out of production).  
                                                           
15 Annual publication "Kostenstrukturerhebung im Verarbeitenden Gewerbe", Fachserie 4, Reihe 4.3, Federal 
Statistical Office Germany. 
 
16 For some of the disaggregated inputs the median is zero e.g. external repair or commodity inputs.   31
 
Descriptive and summary statistics of these variables is given in Table A.1. 
Table A.1 Summary Statistics 
 
industry=21.12     
Variable  N  Mean Median Std Dev Minimum  Maximum
j




it x s ∑ ∆   723  0.004818 0.0148839 0.6451854 -3.2850462  3.5059476
it q ∆   723  0.0090258 0.0352895 0.7050388 -3.5591231  4.3831853
K
it x ∆   723  0.0208974 -0.0011478 0.4209932 -3.2040333  4.3041604
      
industry=21.21     
  N  Mean Median Std Dev Minimum  Maximum
j




it x s ∑ ∆   963  0.0234416 0.0253489 0.4502464 -3.9899468  2.6135388
it q ∆   963  0.0265166 0.0304921 0.4872715 -4.1279828  3.1548552
K
it x ∆   963  0.0148273 -0.0016671 0.2628974 -3.1449463  3.6247483
      
industry=21.22     
  N  Mean Median Std Dev Minimum  Maximum
j




it x s ∑ ∆   266  0.0731409 0.0302522 0.4195623 -2.7681464  2.8305853
it q ∆   266  0.0925404 0.0388029 0.3813545 -0.9083083  2.4343572
K
it x ∆   266  0.0432327 0.0111289 0.2476077 -1.1836425  1.9539636
      
industry=21.23     
  N  Mean Median Std Dev Minimum  Maximum
j




it x s ∑ ∆   366  0.0027215 0.0066356 0.4448995 -3.2189421  2.4136701
it q ∆   366  -0.0014274 0.0078922 0.4670731 -2.8815944  2.6132311
K
it x ∆   366  0.0027046 0.010091 0.3074197 -2.0234494  3.1780997
      
industry=21.24     
  N  Mean Median Std Dev Minimum  Maximum
j




it x s ∑ ∆   93  0.0430926 0.0256914 0.4336823 -2.1556579  2.2433137
it q ∆   93  0.0457506 0.0171719 0.4709101 -2.2994569  2.6634441
K
it x ∆   93  0.0439628 0.0086648 0.2544172 -0.2071941  2.1630706
      
industry=21.25     
  N  Mean Median Std Dev Minimum  Maximum  32
j




it x s ∑ ∆   365  0.0609528 0.0252238 0.4085804 -1.9812804  4.036668
it q ∆   365  0.0649684 0.0255725 0.4316059 -2.0140028  4.1631456
K
it x ∆   365  0.0502231 0.0024815 0.3410033 -0.6993393  3.9117969
      
industry=24.41     
  N  Mean Median Std Dev Minimum  Maximum
j




it x s ∑ ∆   67  0.0527597 0.0388586 0.1774545 -0.5342341  0.7406748
it q ∆   67  0.0615969 0.0492295 0.2227516 -0.5573024  0.8710073
K
it x ∆   67  0.0133705 0.0103796 0.1259894 -0.6389148  0.3897293
      
industry=24.42     
  N  Mean Median Std Dev Minimum  Maximum
j




it x s ∑ ∆   1122  0.0350077 0.0366927 0.2387039 -2.7452303  1.528943
it q ∆   1122  0.0352628 0.039854 0.2600308 -2.0686421  1.8344796
K
it x ∆   1122  0.0260449 0.0130287 0.1642539 -0.7495198  2.5673259
      
industry=32.10     
  N  Mean Median Std Dev Minimum  Maximum
j




it x s ∑ ∆   576  0.0751965 0.0633498 0.380185 -4.1947369  3.4885288
it q ∆   576  0.0975919 0.0863442 0.4045079 -3.4577964  3.6599771
K
it x ∆   576  0.0554216 0.0261469 0.3523875 -3.513382  4.2481335
      
industry=32.20     
  N  Mean Median Std Dev Minimum  Maximum
j




it x s ∑ ∆   328  0.044267 0.0324952 0.4942269 -3.9762242  2.3525736
it q ∆   328  0.0496361 0.0502071 0.5136179 -4.0025612  2.4612378
K
it x ∆   328  0.0241231 0.014758 0.3082709 -4.1266221  2.327498
      
industry=32.30     
  N  Mean Median Std Dev Minimum  Maximum
j




it x s ∑ ∆   565  0.0687687 0.0500873 0.3329547 -1.5429606  4.0460697
it q ∆   565  0.0763184 0.0522964 0.3512364 -1.4025684  4.1476407
K
it x ∆   565  0.0246211 -0.000157358 0.2536278 -0.5190998  4.11483
      
industry=34.10     
  N  Mean Median Std Dev Minimum  Maximum
j




it x s ∑ ∆   317  0.1628428 0.058494 0.6043279 -0.427242  4.4342449
it q ∆   317  0.1793679 0.0765447 0.6875066 -0.5494069  4.9274617
K
it x ∆   317  0.1048413 0.0110806 0.5628581 -1.0263429  4.5636435
      
industry=34.20     
  N  Mean Median Std Dev Minimum  Maximum
j




it x s ∑ ∆   1479  0.0076452 0.0079824 0.4352343 -4.0810918  4.0137286
it q ∆   1479  -0.000509325 0.0037078 0.4706937 -4.6056023  4.2767871
K
it x ∆   1479  0.0297288 0.0113139 0.384048 -4.566166  4.6682714
      
industry=34.30     
  N  Mean Median Std Dev Minimum  Maximum
j




it x s ∑ ∆   1553  0.0674257 0.0607536 0.4860412 -3.1502719  3.4120821
it q ∆   1553  0.078784 0.0710374 0.5208374 -3.1705696  3.5871108
K
it x ∆   1553  0.0369426 0.0087335 0.310694 -4.0315347  4.6684365
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